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\n\n \n \n Girard, P.; Pavlov, V.; and Wilson, M. C.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n \n Networked crowds answer tricky questions poorly.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n ,8pp. 2016.\n
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@article{GPW2016,\n title={Networked crowds answer tricky questions poorly},\n author={Girard, Patrick and Pavlov, Valery and Wilson, Mark C.},\n journal={},\n volume={},\n number={},\n pages={8pp},\n year={2016},\n publisher={},\n keywords={network science},\n url_Paper={},\n abstract={We focus on the following basic group decision situation, which we call\niterative distributed jury (IDJ), a variant of the Delphi technique.\nGroup members seek to answer truthfully a question having a welldefined\nobjectively correct answer; they revise answers iteratively; only\nsummary feedback on group members' answers is available at each\niteration; individual estimates are aggregated to form a group answer.\nExperimental studies of the effectiveness of Delphi-like methods have\nyielded mixed results. To investigate further, we designed a laboratory\nmultiple choice IDJ experiment having some novel features. One novelty\nwas that we incentivized participants to reveal their ignorance; another\nis the use of both logical and factual questions. We find that, perhaps\nsurprisingly, substantial social influence occurs even in this highly\nanonymized and information-restricted setting, and even for purely\nlogical questions. Eventual group accuracy is strongly dependent on the\ntrickiness (likelihood of being answered confidently but wrongly, a\nconcept distinct from difficulty) of the question. Also, the bulk of\nlearning occurs by those who were willing to admit to being undecided.\nWe find that question factors are more important than participant\ncharacteristics. In addition to consequences for the practical use of\nthis group decision method, our quantitative results suggest specific\nnew models of opinion dynamics that deserve detailed study.} \n}\n\n
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\n We focus on the following basic group decision situation, which we call iterative distributed jury (IDJ), a variant of the Delphi technique. Group members seek to answer truthfully a question having a welldefined objectively correct answer; they revise answers iteratively; only summary feedback on group members' answers is available at each iteration; individual estimates are aggregated to form a group answer. Experimental studies of the effectiveness of Delphi-like methods have yielded mixed results. To investigate further, we designed a laboratory multiple choice IDJ experiment having some novel features. One novelty was that we incentivized participants to reveal their ignorance; another is the use of both logical and factual questions. We find that, perhaps surprisingly, substantial social influence occurs even in this highly anonymized and information-restricted setting, and even for purely logical questions. Eventual group accuracy is strongly dependent on the trickiness (likelihood of being answered confidently but wrongly, a concept distinct from difficulty) of the question. Also, the bulk of learning occurs by those who were willing to admit to being undecided. We find that question factors are more important than participant characteristics. In addition to consequences for the practical use of this group decision method, our quantitative results suggest specific new models of opinion dynamics that deserve detailed study.\n
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\n\n \n \n Sakhaee, N.; Wilson, M. C.; and Zakeri, G.\n\n\n \n \n \n \n \n New Zealand Legislation Network.\n \n \n \n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n In
JURIX, pages 199-202, 2016. \n
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@inproceedings{sakhaee2016new,\n title={New Zealand Legislation Network.},\n author={Sakhaee, Neda and Wilson, Mark C. and Zakeri, Golbon},\n booktitle={JURIX},\n pages={199-202},\n year={2016},\n keywords={network science},\n url_Paper={SWZ2016.pdf},\n abstract={This paper concerns the recently introduced concept of Legislation\nNetworks, with an application focus on the New Zealand legislation\nnetwork. Legislation networks have some novel features which make them\nan excellent test case for new network science tools. They involve legal\ndocuments, but differ substantially from citation networks involving\ncase-law, Supreme Court opinions, etc. We develop several such networks,\ncompute relevant centrality measures, and apply community detection\nalgorithms. We study the relationship between the legislation network\nmeasures and legal/political factors. The intention is to follow-up with\nmore detailed studies in network science (link prediction, node\nattribute prediction, generative models and time evolution) and legal\nand political analyses.}\n}\n\n\n
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\n This paper concerns the recently introduced concept of Legislation Networks, with an application focus on the New Zealand legislation network. Legislation networks have some novel features which make them an excellent test case for new network science tools. They involve legal documents, but differ substantially from citation networks involving case-law, Supreme Court opinions, etc. We develop several such networks, compute relevant centrality measures, and apply community detection algorithms. We study the relationship between the legislation network measures and legal/political factors. The intention is to follow-up with more detailed studies in network science (link prediction, node attribute prediction, generative models and time evolution) and legal and political analyses.\n
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